legislative politics in the EU by determining whether its legislature conforms to legislative behaviour trends of established representative democracies.
The study finds that written parliamentary questions are the only supplementary activity that approaches full 'pluralism' -i.e. which is authored by all MEPs irrespective of legislative rank or demographic. In particular, they are not being monopolised by voteseekers, frontbenchers or otherwise high-ranking MEPs. This is also somewhat true for questions for question time and written declarations, though their overall low participation rates impede a precise analysis of participation rates. Moreover, there is evidence that procedural 'hurdles' lead to domination by vote-seekers and frontbenchers, even in the 'second-order' EP legislature.
Because of their representativeness of various legislative profiles, written questions can be considered an appropriate instrument to analyse intra-party conflict in the EP. The sensitivity analysis further highlights that written questions are the only supplementary activity whose authorship patterns are not impacted by the election year. This is evidence that written parliamentary questions are also immune to electoral/campaigning pressures. It can be concluded that written parliamentary questions are an important avenue for individual MEPs' autonomous action. Their 'considerable' processing costs are borne out to grant an expressive outlet to each individual legislator, free from party whips, electoral and frontbenchers' pressures.
The Impact of Transaction and Opportunity Costs for Legislative Participation

Patterns: Theory and Lessons from the Literature
Theories of legislative behaviour, borrowing from rational-choice theory, often treat legislators as utility-maximisers, and hypothesise that MPs are more likely to engage in a legislative activity when participation costs are low. In recognition to the constraining role of institutions, such scholarship has further recognised that different legislative activities carry different information, transaction and opportunity costs. Different parliamentary activities are therefore expected to attract different types of legislators, having different levels of tolerance for such costs (Ferejohn and Fiorina 1975; Hall 1996; Mayhew 1974 Mayhew [2004 ; Shepsle and Boncek 1997) .
Legislators' types are usually condensed into the 'show horse' vs. 'work horse' dichotomy -the first supremely concerned about status and electoral success, the latter about policy (Payne 1980) . Vote-seekers and/or high-status legislators (the 'show horses') dominate resource-intensive activities -whose participation is more competitive and hence more visible -because they able to face such opportunity and transaction costs (Hall 1996; Mayhew 1974 Mayhew [2004 ). High constraints are thus hypothesized to incentivise non-representative participation patterns, hindering 'pluralistic' participation. Activities that are comparatively more difficult to table attract the interest of the leadership who wants to exploit constrained activities for maximum electoral impact.
The literature expects frontbenchers to monopolise costly activities primarily because they are responsible for the party's electoral fortunes and image (Hall 1996) . Party leaderships were formed to counteract collective action problems in political parties, and, more specifically, to avoid electorally costly party splits and programmatic lack of clarity Myatt 2007, 2008) . Party leaders thus primarily attend to electoral imperatives rather than to policy imperatives. Studies of intra-party policy positioning, for example, highlighted that party leaders are less ideologically committed than party activists, and advertise more moderate, centripetal policy preferences (Stokes 1999; Strøm 1990; Ware 1992) . Frontbenchers have an interest to manage and control highly mediatised and/or resource intensive parliamentary activities because, being such activities in short supply, even the smallest blunder could do damage to the party label.
By limiting backbench involvement, frontbenchers can thus better achieve control of the party brand (Proksch and Slapin 2012) .
Other high-ranking party members -such as committee chairs, for example -are hypothesised to monopolise 'costly' parliamentary activities because of their superior informational and institutional resources, which render any opportunity and transaction cost minimal. Electorally marginal members or 'simple' vote-seekers are instead hypothesised to self-select into such activities in spite of the costs and institutional barriers in order to benefit from their higher visibility and potential electoral returns. To summarise:
H1: the higher the procedural constraints of a parliamentary activity, the higher the domination by frontbenchers.
H2: the higher the procedural constraints of a parliamentary activity, the higher the domination by committee chairmen.
H3: the higher the procedural constraints of a parliamentary activity, the higher the domination by vote-seekers.
Several applied studies of legislative participation have investigated the involvement of party leaders and 'vote-seekers' to determine the nature of a particular legislative activity. This literature highlights that speeches, oral questions and questions for question time are mostly tabled by high ranking party members and electorally marginal members of parliament (Blidook 2010; Franklin and Norton 1993; Hill and Hurley 2002; Proksch and Slapin 2012; Rasch 2011; Russo and Wiberg 2010; Slapin and Proksch 2010; Soroka et al. 2009; Wiberg 1995) . High status and electoral marginality were also found to be a factor in the tabling of private member bills and of early day motions (Bowler 2010; Bräuninger et al. 2012; Kellermann 2013) . Similar studies find that written questions are instead not associated with either frontbenchers or electorally marginal members (Dandoy 2011; Jensen et al. 2013; Lazardeux 2005; Rush and Giddings 2011) . This literature, however, only investigates participation in legislative activities in isolation, and models activities differently. Moreover, lacking a comparative design, the extant studies are unable to fully examine the role of procedural incentives in explaining different participation patterns.
The EP-specific literature on parliamentary questioning, motions and written declarations is also limited. Most academic studies are in fact focused on speeches or roll call votes (Hix et al. 2007; Hug 2009; Proksch and Slapin 2009; Slapin and Proksch 2010) . Some studies have analysed parliamentary questioning in the European Parliament, however, their aim was to gauge the extent to which the EP is an informational legislature, i.e. whether parliamentary questioning fosters specialisation and information-acquisition (Bowler and Farrell 1995; Proksch and Slapin 2010; Raunio 1996) . No study to date has looked at EP supplementary activities in comparison, nor examined which of these legislative activities are 'selective' -i.e. monopolised by high-ranking or vote-seeking members (Hall 1996) , nor investigated the procedural characteristics that lead to different degrees of 'selectiveness'. This article addresses these gaps.
Legislative activities differ in the degree to which they impose participation costs on individual MEPs. The window of opportunity that each activity bestows on individual MEPs can be preliminarily gauged by the procedural constraints they impose (Hall 1996) . Therefore, the article first 'ranks' legislative activities of the EP according to their procedural constraints. Subsequently, it models participation rates for each activity separately, and thereafter compares the regression results across legislative activities. however heavily regulated since they can only be asked during plenary -and therefore televised since plenary meetings are formally public (Corbett et al. 2011:191) Questions for oral answer can only be tabled by a committee, an EP party group or at least 40 MEPs. They have no secure time slot during the plenary debate and hence they are accompanied by a request to be included in the plenary agenda. If the request is not accommodated within three months the question will simply lapse. The Commission will be notified one week in advance, while the notice to be given to the Council is three One minute speeches are delivered by an MEP whose request for the floor to the EP President has been successful. The President is required to ensure ideological and nationality-based proportionality when allowing such requests. Other than time limits, this type of activity has slight topic constraints as the one-minute speech must relate to the topics dealt with in the sitting in question (Corbett et al. 2011:191-203; EU 2010: Rule 149).
Analysis
Ranking Supplementary Activities on their Procedural Constraints
Debates include legislative and non-legislative debates which originate from the relevant committee reports, after these are presented in the plenary or from oral questioning procedures and EU executive statements. Speaking time is limited and allocated to political groups proportionally to their size, after a 'baseline' equal amount of speaking time has been granted to every group. The speaking time agenda for each debate is drafted by the President and the Conference of Presidents and approved by the plenary. Members selected to speak cannot depart from the subject (EU 2010: Rule 149). The amount of group speaking time to be used by each MEP is decided by their group. Usually groups devolve all their allocated time to the relevant spokespersons but others also try to set aside time to other members after spokespersons have been given the floor (Corbett et al., 2011: 197-198, 214-315) .
Motions for resolution can be tabled by individual members. There is no limit on how many can be tabled but they must not exceed 200 words. A motion is then forwarded to the responsible committee. This body can decide whether to ignore it, include it in a relevant report or use the motion to initiate a non-legislative, 'own-initiative' report.
Motions can also be requested after a debate. When requested after a debate, they need to be tabled by a committee, 40 MEPs or a political group and they are called 'joint motions for resolution' (EU 2010: Rules 115, 120).
Written declarations can be tabled by individual MEPs up to a maximum of five MEPs.
There are no limits on the number that an individual can submit but they must not exceed 200 words or deal with issues that are subject to an on-going legislative process.
They need the approval of the President to be placed in the register, where they are recorded in order to gather signatories. If the majority of MEPs does not sign, a declaration will lapse. If it gains sufficient signatures it is published in the minutes as an adopted text and forwarded to the EU executives (EU 2010: Rule 123; Groffen and Lehmann 2011).
[ the least constrained activities. At the procedural level, therefore, they seem to differ from all other activities available to legislators in the EP in that they do not require the same institutional resources or carry the same electoral weight. They are thus expected to grant more opportunities to individual initiative than all other activities analysed.
Although on public record, they are less formal than all other activities and, therefore, they are expected to be less 'selective', i.e. less exclusive in their participation patterns (Hall 1996 : 30 , 52 & 86-110) . Below, a multilevel negative binomial regression model tackles this issue more directly by testing whether there usage of these activities differs systematically by legislator profile. The activity count for each EP7 MEP is the dependent variable, which is overdispersed. A negative binomial (NB) regression model is applied here to model the over-dispersed count data, except for questions for question time whose extreme zeroinflation problem was accounted for by using a logistic regression model. 1 The exposure -capturing the log number of months served by each MEP during the EP7 -was added to the model in order to account for members that were incoming or outgoing, which in the EP7 were 186 in total (13% of seats in the EP7 were substituted). A multilevel modelling approach was adopted because of the hierarchical nature of the data. MEPs are in fact clustered by party and member state, making it necessary to control for possible country and party effects that are not modelled directly.
The first key independent variables is Frontbencher. The variable measures whether the MEP was a member of the party and EPG leaderships (1) or not (0) Manifesto Study (variable pro_anti_EU). It theoretically ranges from -100 (extreme eurosceptic) to +100 (extreme europhile).
Party Months in National Government is measured as the number of EP7 months the national party was part of the national executive. It ranges from 0 (consistently in opposition) to 60 (consistently in government). The variable controls for the different propensity for legislative activism of opposition members.
Results
Simple descriptives of the data (see Figure 1 below These inconsistencies, however, might also be due to adopting an aggregate ranking of constraints, without qualitatively discriminating among procedural constraints. It appears, for example, that the question for question time procedural restriction on numbers to be tabled per month might result in an equalising effect instead.
Looking at procedural constraints in isolation, it appears that parliamentary activities subject to the procedural requirement of group-sanctioned participation (oral questions and, to some extent, motions) lead to the over-involvement of frontbenchers and otherwise high ranking party members (e.g. chairs or seniors). The requirement of plenary performance equally has a 'selectiveness' effect: it incentivises in particular vote-seeker domination (with the exception of questions for question time). Topics, length and notice period requirements, as well as the requirement for Presidential approval, seem to play inconsistent roles. The restriction on numbers, as noted above, seems to help pluralism instead.
To summarise, written questions and questions for question time do not show any particular usage patterns and appear to represent all legislators and political parties, except for written questions under-representing committee chairs. In contrast, speeches over-represent prospective candidates, indicating that they might be essential to electoral success. Oral questions over-represent frontbenchers, committee chairs, women and Europhiles. Oral questions are 'show-horse' activities and appear to be strong candidates for 'oversight' activities of the theatrical/public-confrontation type,
given their monopoly by members with high executive access. Motions also seem to require institutional capital. They are the prerogative of the 'show-horses', since they over-represent frontbenchers, seniors, prospective candidates as well as Europhiles.
Written declarations are not monopolised by the show-horses or vote-seekers, but they are not fully representative of the universe of EP legislators either, being predominantly tabled by women and parties supportive of European integration.
Written parliamentary questions and questions for question time were found to represent all party roles and, broadly, the legislative chamber in its entirety and function as strongly pluralistic outlets for inputs to the EU policy making process. The pluralism of participation in questions for question time is however offset by their rarity: only 178
MEPs in the EP7 tabled questions for question time and only 25 MEPs submitted more than 10. By way of contrast, 818 MEPs submitted at least one written question and 648
MEPs submitted more than 10.
Sensitivity Analysis: Usage Patterns during the Election Year
To test the robustness of the conclusions, and to further assess the participation patterns of the various supplementary legislative activities, the same model was tested on activities' counts in the final 12 months of the EP7 legislative term, the 'election year'.
Questions for question time had to be dropped from the analysis since no question time happened in the final legislative year of EP7.
Multiple studies have found that facing re-election impacts legislative behaviour by increasing vote-seeking tendencies in legislators (Jones 2003; Mayhew 1974 Mayhew [2004 ).
Name recognition, credit-claiming and self-promotion become paramount goals when legislators seek re-election (Cain et al. 1984; Mayhew 1974 Mayhew [2004 ). The election year should give additional incentives to the show horses to monopolise supply-scarce activities. If written parliamentary questions are not monopolised by the 'show horses' when analysing the entire legislative term, but turn out to be used differently when electoral pressures dominate, then the hypotheses of procedural effects on legislative participation patterns may be called into question. If the results hold, the hypotheses on procedural effects could be strengthened instead.
[ TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
The inferences drawn on written questions remain unvaried. Conversely, there are some interesting changes in authorship patterns for the remaining activities which further support hypotheses 1-3. In particular, candidates deliver 32% more speeches than non-candidates in the election year, up from 29% in the full sample. This is a strong indication of the predominantly electoral function of speeches. Further, oral questions keep being dominated by frontbenchers, though to a lesser extent (26% more oral questions than backbenchers in the election year, down from 57% in the full sample analysis), while domination by committee chairs increases (3.5 times more motions than non-chairs in the election year, up from 2.9 times in the full sample analysis). Frontbenchers keep monopolising motions in the election year (down to 60% more motion than backbenchers in the election year, from 93% more in the full sample analysis), while prospective candidates table way more motions during the election year (2.1 times more motions than non-candidates, up from 51% more motion in the full sample analysis). Inferences on written declarations remain roughly unvaried, except for an increase in the involvement of women and of MEPs with more administrative assistants. Figure 2 offers a summary of the conclusions drawn above.
[ The results show that there are both pluralistic and vote-seeking activities in the 'second order' EU legislature, and that participation patterns broadly conform to patterns found in other established representative democracies. In particular, group and plenary activities seem to galvanize frontbenchers and vote-seekers, which have superior incentives to control such costly and 'supply scarce' activities.
Among the supplementary parliamentary activities of the EP, written questions are found to be both the least leadership-dominated and the least procedurally constrained activities. MEPs are thus expected to be freer from leadership pressures in tabling written questions, the implication being that they might feel thus freer to express their individual preferences in them. All other publicly available legislative activities of the EP were found here to be mostly used by the 'show-horses', and thus to not differ very much from roll call voting, in their incentive structures. The study confirms the notion that the more highly constrained activities are monopolised by vote-seekers, frontbenchers or otherwise prominent members of political parties. Given the electoral focus of party leaderships and their role in ensuring party unity, investigating political parties' via leadership-dominated instruments may not ideal for some research aims, e.g. studies of intra-party conflict.
Written parliamentary questions may therefore provide an alternative to roll call vote analysis when the aim is to investigate intra-party politics. Not all roll call votes are recorded in the European Parliament: those that are, are not a random sample of the roll call votes population and often called by EPGs strategically to induce cohesion or expose party disunity in other EPGs (Carrubba et al. 2006; Hug 2009 ). The high partycohesion of EP roll call votes (Hix et al. 2007 ) is also problematic. In addition, written parliamentary questions appear appropriate for studies of political representation more broadly, as they can be used to more accurately measure the internal ideological spectrum of each political party. Due to their more tenuous link with the policy adoption stage, written questions may be particularly appropriate for the evaluation of 'input democracy' -i.e. the representative quality of the EU policy cycle's input stage, considered by many theorists crucial in the assessment of representative democracies (Bellamy 2010; Dahl 1989; Goodin 2003 
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